

# TECHNICAL REPORT



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**Safety of machinery – Security aspects related to functional safety of safety-related control systems**

INTERNATIONAL  
ELECTROTECHNICAL  
COMMISSION

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ICS 13.110; 29.020

ISBN 978-2-8322-6818-6

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## INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

**SAFETY OF MACHINERY –  
SECURITY ASPECTS RELATED TO FUNCTIONAL  
SAFETY OF SAFETY-RELATED CONTROL SYSTEMS**

## FOREWORD

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Technical Report IEC TR 63074 has been prepared by IEC technical committee 44: Safety of machinery – Electrotechnical aspects.

The text of this Technical Report is based on the following documents:

DTR	Report on voting
44/842/DTR	44/843/RVDTR

Full information on the voting for the approval of this Technical Report can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC web site under "<http://webstore.iec.ch>" in the data related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be

- reconfirmed,
- withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

A bilingual version of this publication may be issued at a later date.

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## INTRODUCTION

Industrial automation systems can be exposed to security attacks due to the fact that:

- access to the control system is possible, e.g. re-programming of machine functions (including safety);
- "convergence" between standard IT and industrial systems is increasing;
- operating systems have become present in embedded systems, e.g. IP-based protocols are replacing proprietary network protocols and data is exchanged directly from the SCADA network into the office world;
- software is developed by reusing existing third party software components;
- remote access from suppliers has become the standard way of operations / maintenance, with an increased cyber security risk regarding e.g. unauthorized access, availability and integrity.

As part of an industrial automation system, safety-related control systems of machines can also be subject to security attacks that can result in a loss of the ability to maintain safe operation of a machine.

NOTE 1 The risk potential of attack opportunities is significant seeing the trends and developments of threats and the amount of known vulnerabilities. Security objectives are mainly described in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability, which in general need to be identified and prioritized by using a risk based approach.

Functional safety objectives consider the risk by estimating the severity of harm and the probability of occurrence of that harm: The effects of any risk (hazardous event) determine the requirements for safety integrity, (Safety Integrity Level (SIL) according to IEC 62061 or IEC 61508 or Performance Level (PL) according to ISO 13849-1).

With respect to the safety function, the security threats (internal or external) might influence the safety integrity and the overall system availability.

NOTE 2 In order to ensure the security objectives, IEC 62443-3-3 defines and recommends security requirements ("foundational requirements") to be fulfilled by the relevant system.

NOTE 3 The overall security strategy is not covered in this standard, further information is provided e.g. in IEC 62443 (all parts) or ISO/IEC 27001.

Misuse by physical manipulation is covered in some machinery functional safety standards (e.g. IEC 61496 (all parts) and ISO 14119).

NOTE 4 "Misuse by physical manipulation" is not considered to be the same as physical security in the IEC 62443 (all parts), for example in IEC 62443-2-1:2010, 4.3.3.3. Physical security means for example control (restriction) of access by means of physical obstruction.

# SAFETY OF MACHINERY – SECURITY ASPECTS RELATED TO FUNCTIONAL SAFETY OF SAFETY-RELATED CONTROL SYSTEMS

## 1 Scope

This Technical Report gives guidance on the use of IEC 62443 (all parts) related to those aspects of security threats and vulnerabilities that could influence functional safety implemented and realized by safety-related control systems (SCS) and could lead to the loss of the ability to maintain safe operation of a machine.

NOTE 1 For example, an attack on a machine (safety function) such that it affects the availability of the machine and can result in a safety function being bypassed.

Considered security aspects of the machine with potential relation to SCS are:

- vulnerabilities of the SCS either directly or indirectly through the other parts of the machine which can be exploited by security threats that can result in security attacks (security breach);
- influence on the safety characteristics and ability of the SCS to properly perform its function(s);
- typical use case definition and application of a corresponding threat model.

NOTE 2 For other aspects of security threats and vulnerabilities, the provisions of the IEC 62443 (all parts) can apply.

## 2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 62061, *Safety of machinery - Functional safety of safety-related electrical, electronic and programmable electronic control systems*

ISO 12100:2010, *Safety of machinery – General principles for design — Risk assessment and risk reduction*

ISO 13849-1:2015, *Safety of machinery – Safety-related parts of control systems – Part 1: General principles for design*